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Abstract Acquired equivalence was investigated using a vir-
tual reality conditioned suppression task administered in a
first-person-shooter game. Two visual cues, A1 and B1, were
followed by a tone (O1), and another two cues, A2 and B2,
were followed by another tone (O2). During differential Pav-
lovian conditioning, A1 was paired with an instructed uncon-
ditioned stimulus (US) consisting of a flashing white screen,
whereas A2 was not. All cues and outcomes were then pre-
sented at test, in the absence of the US, and suppression ratios
were calculated for multiple response topographies (shots,
hits, and breaks). Clear evidence of the suppression of shots
was seen for A1 and B1, with no suppression being seen for
either A2 or B2. Presentations of O1 and O2 resulted in
significant suppression of shots and hits, whereas only O1
led to the suppression of breaks. The US expectancy ratings
were consistent with these behavioral results. The findings are
discussed in the light of differing accounts of acquired
equivalence.
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Acquired equivalence refers to the finding that stimuli sharing
a common outcome are often shown to be equivalent, and that
changes applied to one stimulus may generalize to the other
stimulus without further training (Hall, 1996; Honey & Hall,
1989). In a typical variant of common-outcome training, two
stimuli predict different outcomes, which results in an increase
in the discriminability of those stimuli; also, training in which
two stimuli predict the same outcome results in a decrease in
their discriminability. For instance, Ward-Robinson and Hall
(1999) presented rats with two stimuli, A1 and A2, which
were each followed by reward, whereas another, B, was not.
Later, one stimulus (A1) was paired with shock, and it was
found that fear generalized from A1 to A2, but not to B. Other
studies with nonhumans (e.g., Bonardi, Rey, Richmond &
Hall, 1993; Kaiser, Sherburne, Steirn & Zentall, 1997)
adapted training designs from the early human discrimination
literature to test acquired equivalence. Pigeons were first
presented with two stimuli, A and B, which were followed
by X, and a further two stimuli, C and D, which were followed
by Y. Next, another discrimination was trained that was either
consistent or inconsistent with the previous training. It was
found that acquisition was faster when the reinforced stimuli
were A and B and the nonreinforced stimuli were C and D, as
compared to A and C and B and D, respectively, in the
inconsistent condition. In this way, generalization was en-
hanced between stimuli that had shared a common event in
the first stage of training (acquired equivalence).
Hall, Mitchell, Graham and Lavis (2003) found evidence
for an associative-mediation account of acquired equivalence
in experiments employing a multistage discrimination design.
For example, initial training, in which no overt response was
required, associated two shape stimuli (A and B) with the
presentation of one outcome (the nonsense syllable wug),
and another two shapes (C and D) with another (the nonsense
syllable zif). In a second stage, groups of participants were
trained in two different motor responses (press a key on the
left or press a key on the right) in the presence of shapes that
either shared a common outcome (consistent condition) or did
not (inconsistent condition). Superior performance was ob-
served in the consistent condition, indicating an acquired-
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equivalence effect. According to the association-mediation
account, Stage 1 training adds an associative link to the
stimulus representations, such that subsequent retrieval of
the associations during test facilitates generalized transfer.
Further studies, in which the influence of associative media-
tion was minimized, revealed evidence for an attentional-
process account of acquired equivalence (Bonardi, Graham,
Hall & Mitchell, 2005). The attentional-process, or feature
salience (Meeter, Shohamy & Myers, 2009), account assumes
that each of the four cues (A, B, C, and D) will share features
with the others, such that A and B will have x in common,
whereas C and D will share y in common. Training comes to
establish feature x as being predictive of the outcome that
follows A and B, whereas feature y is predictive of the common
outcomes following C and D. Thus, discrimination is facilitated
in the consistent training condition by paying increased attention
to the predictive features and learning to make one response to
both cues that share feature x, and another response to the cues
that share feature y (see also Mackintosh, 1975). Bonardi et al.
(2005) concluded that, with appropriately controlled designs, it
is possible to demonstrate evidence for the attentional-process
account, but that both attentional and associative processes
likely operate in tandem in discrimination tasks of this kind.
Acquired equivalence may have relevance for understand-
ing the generalization of conditioned emotional responses to
cues indirectly related via common antecedents and/or out-
comes (Hermans, Baeyens & Vervliet, 2013). For instance, a
demonstration that fear-eliciting properties may generalize
from a learned cue to related cues via acquired equivalence
would mean that when the elements of this representational
network are highly associated, activation of one element of the
network (e.g., the perception of a dog or an odor) might be
sufficient to activate the whole network and hence lead to the
experience of fear or anxiety. From this perspective, general-
ization concerns the question of how stimuli that are related to
the original CS are integrated into this associative network and
thus acquire the potency to elicit the fear response. (Hermans
et al., 2013, p. 127)
Generalization of conditioned fear such as this, as a conse-
quence of acquired equivalence based on common outcomes,
is a robust phenomenon in the nonhuman literature (e.g.,
Honey & Hall, 1989) but has not been well studied with
humans. Although it is now accepted that the generalization
of conditioned responses is a core component in the develop-
ment, maintenance, and severity of psychopathology such as
that seen in anxiety and other disorders (Dymond & Roche,
2009; Dymond, Roche & Bennett, 2013; Hermans et al.,
2013; Lissek, Biggs, Rabin, Cornwell, Alvarez, Pine &
Grillon, 2008), a demonstration of generalization via acquired
equivalence involving a clinically relevant process such as
conditioned suppression would be salutary.
In the present study, therefore, we employed a virtual
reality environment “first-person-shooter” (FPS) videogame
(Greville, Newton, Roche&Dymond, 2013) to investigate the
generalization of clinically relevant conditioned suppression
via acquired equivalence based on common outcomes. Con-
ditioned suppression is a model of the range and type of
response disruption often seen in anxiety disorders, in which
a fear-eliciting cue interferes with or otherwise suppresses
ongoing instrumental behavior (Estes & Skinner, 1941). Al-
though the human research that has been conducted to date on
acquired equivalence has employed a range of innovative
paradigms and designs (e.g., Bonardi et al., 2005; Hall et al.,
2003; Hodder, George, Killcross & Honey, 2003; Meeter
et al., 2009; Molet, Miller & Zentall, 2011; Preston, Shrager,
Dudukovic & Gabrieli, 2004; O’Reilly, Roche, Ruiz, Tyndall
& Gavin, 2012; Smyth, Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-Holmes,
2008), little is known about whether or not generalized sup-
pression might be observed following a history of acquired
equivalence based on common outcomes. Toward this end,
virtual reality environments permit the fine-grained manipu-
lation of different variables (such as common outcomes) and
the measurement of multiple topographies of behavior in self-
paced, motivating tasks that are well suited to the study of
generalized suppression on the basis of acquired equivalence
via common outcome training.
In the present study, using a within-subjects design, a three-
stage training and testing procedure was arranged (see Table 1)
in which presentations of two visual cues (A1 and B1) were
followed by a common auditory stimulus (O1), whereas an-
other two visual cues (A2 and B2) were followed by another
auditory stimulus (O2). Next, during differential Pavlovian
conditioning, A1 was followed by an instructed uncondi-
tioned stimulus (US), which was aversive in the context of
the game, whereas A2 was not. During the crucial test phase,
all cues and outcomes were presented, in the absence of the
US, and suppression ratios were calculated for the multiple
dependent measures afforded by the virtual reality task
(Greville et al., 2013). If the common-outcome training was
sufficient to create equivalent cues, then the conditioned sup-
pressive effects associated with A1 should generalize to B1
(and O1), but not to B2 (and O2).
Table 1 Design of the experiment
Phase 1: Common-Outcome and Operant Training
A1→O1 A2→O2
B1→O1 B2→O2
Phase 2: Pavlovian Conditioning
A1+ A2−
Phase 3: Testing
A1? B1? O1? A2? B2? O2?
A1, A2, B1, and C2 represent visual cues, and O1 andO2 represent tones.
“+”, followed by the unconditioned stimulus (US); “−”, not followed by
the US; “?”, test trials presented in the absence of the US.
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Method
Participants
A group of 32 students and staff (17 women, 15 men) with a
mean age of 27.7 years (SD = 6.84) were recruited from
Swansea University and participated in return for either £5 or
partial course credit.
Apparatus and stimuli
The experiment was conducted using a Dell Optiplex 755 PC
running Microsoft Windows XP with a 27-in. Iiyama monitor
as the visual display. A Logitech Rumblepad II wireless joy-
pad controlled movement throughout the virtual environment
(VE). Game sounds and the auditory stimuli used as two of the
CSs were delivered via Grado SR60 headphones.
The VE was designed using the Hammer Editor, part of the
Source SDK package from Valve Software, with code written
using Microsoft Visual C++ Express Edition and the Steam
client used to launch the experiment (Greville et al., 2013).
The VE consisted primarily of two buildings, with outdoor
areas on each side and a pathway linking the two buildings.
Walls were used to keep areas separate, such that participants
could only follow one route through the VE, beginning in the
initial outside area, then progressing through the first building,
along the linking pathway, through the second building, and
then to the final outside area. Participants were prevented from
returning to earlier stages by the automatic closing and
locking of doors. The two buildings comprised six iden-
tical interconnecting rooms consisting of the same basic
layout, with a shelf along the west wall containing rows
of crates and an archway leading to the next room on the
north wall (see the supplemental materials for examples
of screen shots).
Each room within the buildings was illuminated by a
centrally positioned light source. The four CSs consisted of
this light source changing from ambient white light to one
of four colors: blue, green, red, or yellow. This ensured that
the CS was always visible, no matter where participants
were within the building. The colors and outcomes were
partially counterbalanced across participants. The two out-
comes were 4-s auditory tones, generated using Audacity
and delivered at approximately 70 dB via the headphones.
One outcome was a pure tone (simple sine wave) of
600 Hz. The second tone was an oscillating tone produced
by adding a “phaser” effect (Stages 4, LFO Frequency 3.5,
LFO Start phase 40, Depth 200, Feedback 0) to the 600-Hz
pure tone. Pilot testing indicated that the two tones were
discriminable.
The US was 3 s in duration and consisted of the on-screen
display shaking violently, as if the building had sustained a
severe impact. In addition, participants lost a small quantity of
gold that they had collected (100 points) on each occasion (see
the description of procedures below for details of the game
play). If, however, participants made a response during the
US, the screen flashed an additional time, as if there had been
an explosion, and participants lost a larger quantity of gold
(450–550 points). This element was analogous to the
“Martians” paradigm (Arcediano, Ortega & Matute, 1996;
Franssen, Clarysse, Beckers, van Vooren & Baeyens, 2010),
in which the effects of the US are amplified if an instrumental
response is made during the US (see the supplemental
materials for a copy of all task instructions).
Design
Our paradigm involved six distinct CSs—labeled A1, A2, B1,
B2, O1, and O2—presented at different points in a three-phase
design (Table 1). During the common-outcome training, the
stimuli were paired together, such that both A1 and B1 were
always followed by O1, and A2 and B2 were always followed
by O2. In Pavlovian conditioning, only A1 and A2 were
presented, with the US being contingent on A1 but not on
A2. Finally, during testing, all of the stimuli were presented.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a small, darkened
experimental room. In the VE, they first found themselves in
an outdoor area, facing the first building, which served as an
initial orientation zone. During this initial familiarization,
participants were advised via on-screen instructions to famil-
iarize themselves with the controls and to practice moving
around prior to entering the building, at which point the
experiment commenced.
Phase 1: Common outcome and operant training Phase 1
took place in the first building. Participants were instructed
that their primary aim was to find gold bars worth 100 points
per set hidden in wooden crates. The crates were arranged
along one wall in each of six adjoining rooms (24 crates per
wall), and gold bars were placed in a randomly determined six
of the 24 crates on each wall. In total, 144 crates were
presented in Phase 1, with 36 gold bars being dispersed among
these crates; this was sufficient to occupy participants for the
entirety of Phase 1. During the instrumental (i.e., operant)
training, participants learned to shoot crates in order to try to
find gold, and thus to score points. Each crate took four shots
to destroy; thus, every four on-target shots resulted in crate
destruction (i.e., fixed ratio [FR] 4 schedule), and (on average)
every four crates destroyed yielded gold bars (i.e., variable
ratio [VR] 4 schedule). If a gold bar was uncovered, 100
points were added to the participant’s score. Whenever the
participant’s score changed (gain or loss), the running total
was displayed for 2 s in the top left corner of the screen.
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While participants were engaged in this task, common-
outcome training took place, which consisted of 32 trials.
A1, B1, A2, and B2 were presented eight times each and were
always followed by the respective outcome tone; either O1
(for A1 or B1) or O2 (for A2 or B2). Each trial was 10 s in
duration, and the intertrial interval (ITI) was 10 s. Presentation
of either A1, B1, A2, or B2 occurred at a random point within
the first 2 s of the trial, for a 4-s duration, and was immediately
followed by the appropriate outcome, also for 4 s (temporal
variability was introduced in order to alleviate any impression
that the outcomemight be occurring on a fixed-interval sched-
ule, rather than being contingent on the cue). Presentation of
A1, B1, A2, and B2 occurred in a pseudorandom order, with
the constraint that no more than two presentations of each
could occur consecutively. This same restriction was also
applied to stimulus presentation during the two following
phases.
This phase was intended simultaneously to train the oper-
ant response of shooting crates and to establish acquired
equivalence between the stimuli and the outcomes; consistent
with previous research on this topic (e.g., Hall et al., 2003), we
did not conduct a separate, formal test for the acquired equiv-
alence of the cues, other than that presented during the final
test phase.
Phase 2: Pavlovian conditioning On completing Phase 1,
participants left the first building and proceeded to the central
pathway, where they were provided with on-screen instruc-
tions. Phase 2 commenced upon entering the second building,
which had a layout identical to the first. A delay-conditioning
procedure was used, with a 4-s delay between CS+ onset and
US onset (i.e., CS duration = 4 s) and no trace interval
separating CS+ and US. That is, if the US was scheduled, it
was delivered immediately following termination of the CS+
(i.e., A1). Participants were exposed to ten presentations each
of the CS+ and CS– in a pseudorandom order, with the US
following the CS+ on eight of those ten trials (i.e., CS+/US
contingency of .8). The US never followed the CS– (i.e., A2).
Trials were again 10 s in duration, with a 10-s ITI and with the
cue being presented at a random point within the first 2 s of the
trial. Any loss of points due to the US was immediately
displayed on screen.
Phase 3: Testing We tested for the generalization of sup-
pression via acquired equivalence during this phase,
which consisted of 12 trials: two presentations of each
of the six CSs in a pseudorandom order, with no US
presentations. The trial length was the same as we de-
scribed previously. At the conclusion of Phase 3, partic-
ipants were directed to exit the building and proceed to
the final outdoor area, where they were informed that
their mission was complete, presented with their total
score (on screen), and asked to contact the experimenter.
The experimenter then reentered the experimental room and
undertook a brief manipulation check to identify retrospec-
tively the extent to which participants expected the US
following each color (“To what extent did you expect an
explosion to occur after the [colored] light? 1 = not at all,
and 5 = all the time.”). Participants were then debriefed and
compensated.
Data analysis
Suppression ratios of the total number of responses (shots),
shots hitting the targets (hits), and crates destroyed (breaks)
during Phase 3 were calculated: X/(X+Y), where X is the total
number during the CS, and Y is the total number immediately
(4 s) prior to the CS. All trials were included in the analysis;
these data were not normally distributed according to a
D’Agostino and Pearson (1973) omnibus normality test, and
thus were compared using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
(Streiner & Norman, 2011).
Results
Significant suppression of shots was found when participants
were presented with A1, B1, and O1, but not with A2, B2, and
O2 (Fig. 1a). As expected, the greatest suppression was ob-
served for A1,W= −588.0, p< .0001, which had been directly
paired with the US in Phase 2. A2, which was never paired
with the US, showed no significant suppression,W = −143.0,
p= .1246. The B1 cue, which shared a common outcome (O1)
with A1, showed significant suppression, W = −377.0,
p = .0013, whereas the extent of suppression to B2, which
shared a common outcome (O2) with A2, was not significant,
W = −133.0, p = .271. This suggests that A1 and B1, and A2
and B2, respectively, were functionally equivalent by virtue of
their common outcomes, and that the conditioning applied to
one stimulus (A1) successfully generalized to B1, but not to
B2. Significant suppression of shots was found for both of the
outcomes: O1, W = −281.0, p = .0040, and O2, W = −291.0,
p = .0029. Similar effects were found for hits (Fig. 1b) and
breaks, although no significant suppression of breaks was
observed for O2 (Fig. 1c).
Overall, suppression was significantly greater during A1
than during A2 for all measures (all ps < .001). Likewise,
suppression was significantly greater during B1 than during
B2 for breaks (p = .0195), and marginally significant for hits
(W = −238, p = .0523) and shots (W = −195, p = .0831). We
observed no significant difference between O1 and O2 for
shots (W = −40, p = .75), hits (W = −102, p = .35) or breaks
(W = −134, p = .09).
Participants’ postexperimental US expectancy ratings are
shown in Fig. 1d. As predicted, the highest level of expectan-
cy was for A1; with a mean rating of 4.417, this was
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significantly higher than the expectancy rating of 1.5 for A2,
W = −586, p < .001. The ratings made to B1 (1.833) and B2
(1.417) differed (W= −75, p< .01), whereas those made to O1
(1.833) and O2 (1.75) did not differ significantly (W = −12,
p = .6543). Finally, the ratings of O1 and O2 were not
correlated with any of the behavioral suppression measures
(O1: p values between .311 and .930; O2: p values between
.113 and .951).
Discussion
The present study was designed to test the predictions of an
account based on acquired equivalence: that the suppressive
effects of Pavlovian training would generalize to stimuli shar-
ing a common outcome, and not to other stimuli sharing
another outcome. Using a novel virtual reality conditioned
suppression task (Greville et al., 2013), participants
underwent a three-stage training and testing procedure in
which two cues (A1 and B1) were first followed by a common
outcome (O1), whereas two other cues (A2 and B2) were
followed by a different outcome (O2). During Pavlovian
training, one cue (A1) was followed by a flashing white screen
US, which functioned as an aversive stimulus, whereas A2
was not, and in the final test phase, all cues and outcomeswere
presented in the absence of the US. To the extent that the first
stage of training was sufficient to create equivalent cues, the
suppressive effects of A1 should generalize to B1 and not to
B2 (or A2). Both outcomes should increase discrimination
between the cues, such that greater suppression should also be
demonstrated for O1 over O2. These findings revealed clear
evidence of suppression of shots for A1, which was directly
paired with the US, and for B1, which shared common out-
come O1. No suppression was observed for either A2, which
was never directly paired with the US, or with B2, with which
A2 shared the common outcome O2. Presentations of O1 and
O2 resulted in significant suppression of shots and hits, where-
as only O1 led to suppression of breaks. Overall, we found
significant suppression of A1 over A2 for all measures
obtained from the virtual reality task, with similar sup-
pressive effects being noted for B1 over B2 for breaks
and, at marginally significant levels, for hits and shots.
Although O1 and O2 did not differ on the three behav-
ioral measures (shots, hits, and breaks), the findings
from the US expectancy ratings for these outcome stimuli
were consistent with our behavioral results for the A and B
cues (see Fig. 1). Unlike the A and B cues, the difference in
suppression between O1 and O2 was not significant, suggest-
ing that participants did not learn to discriminate between the
outcomes very effectively.
In the introduction, we also considered the predictions
made by an attentional-process account of acquired equiva-
lence (e.g., Bonardi et al., 2005). Applied to the present
findings, an attentional account would presuppose that the
A1 and B1 cues shared feature x in common, and A2 and B2
shared feature y in common. Feature x comes to predict the
common outcome (O1) shared by A1 and B1, whereas feature
y is predictive of the common outcome (O2) shared by A2 and





































































Fig. 1 Suppression ratios for shots (a), hits (b), and breaks (c), as well as
the mean unconditioned-stimulus (US) expectancy ratings (d), for all cues
and outcomes presented during the test phase. Error bars indicate standard
errors of the means. *Significantly different from the paired stimulus (i.e.,
A1 vs. A2, B1 vs. B2)
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B2. Following Pavlovian training, changes applied to A1 and
A2 are also assumed to share the individual features x and y in
common, respectively, which is likely to further facilitate
discrimination between the cues and enhance generalization
of conditioned suppression from A1 to B1 (and O1), and of
nonsuppression from A2 to B2 (and O2).
To some extent, it is difficult to reconcile the present design
and findings with the attentional account, for several reasons.
First, the predictive features x and y remain unspecified. Al-
though it is possible that pairs of stimuli could share popula-
tions of stimulus elements in common, it is at present difficult
to determine what role they might have played in capturing
and retaining attentional resources. Second, all of the cues
were colored lights that did not differ along any other physical
dimensions—more precisely, they had salient features equally
in common. Cues of the same illumination (as far as can be
assumed, in the absence of individual psychophysics), size,
and duration were presented in similar, equally predictable
contexts within the game, and thus it is difficult to determine
how the potential salience of the cues might have been unin-
tentionally varied within the present procedures (cf. Bonardi
et al., 2005). Third, the attentional account may struggle to
explain the mediated-conditioning findings (i.e., O1 > O2). It
does, however, allow for the possibility that mediated condi-
tioning processes may operate in tandem with attentional
processes, which would reconcile the account with the present
findings. Finally, we employed a within-subjects design that
did not require manipulating the consistency of any subse-
quent training involving cues that did or did not share a
common outcome (as has been done in the majority of re-
search conducted to date on acquired equivalence). Of course,
it is readily possible to propose a variant of the present design
in which groups would receive an additional training stage
after common-outcome training in which a particular response
(e.g., pressing a marked key on the left) would be taught for
A1 and B1, and another response (e.g., pressing a marked key
on the right) would be taught for A2 and B2 (consistent
condition), whereas in the inconsistent condition, one re-
sponse might be required for A1 and B2, and another for A2
and B1. Given this arrangement, we would predict findings
similar to those of the present study, although the attentional
account would still need to address exactly which salient
features came to be predictive, given the aforementioned
issues. In conclusion, although it is beyond the remit of the
present article to evaluate the relative merits of the associative-
mediation and attentional accounts, it is likely that either a
combination of associative and attentional processes or
additional (e.g., configural) processes underlie acquired-
equivalence effects like those seen here (for alternative
accounts, see Honey, Close & Lin, 2010; Honey &
Ward-Robinson, 2002).
An associative-mediation account (Hall et al., 2003) of the
present findings would assume that initial common-outcome
training adds an associative link, such that presentations of A1
and B1 evoke representations of each other and of O1; that A2
and B2 evoke representations of each other and of O2; and
that test performance is facilitated by retrieval of these asso-
ciatively linked representations. This account may partly ex-
plain our findings, with the exception that suppression was
observed to both O1 and O2, and not just O1. One potential
factor in explaining the present findings may be the within-
group design employed, which involved a multistage training
and test sequence rather than a consistent/inconsistent
between-group manipulation during the second training stage,
when responses were trained in the presence of stimuli that did
or did not share a common outcome (Hall et al., 2003).
However, a number of other possible procedural explanations
could account for the unexpected suppression to O2.
First, the outcomes were presented in different modalities
than the A and B cues (i.e., auditory tones rather than colored
lights). Although pilot testing indicated that these tones were
discriminable, they may have been less so than the light cues,
and hence, generalization from one to the other may have
occurred in ways that would be difficult to predict and control
when the generalization gradient was unknown. Second, the
discriminability of the outcome stimuli is also questionable,
given the fact that participants were not required to attend to
outcomes, as they were for the A stimuli. In other words, the
outcome stimuli were not themselves discriminative for out-
comes, whereas the A and B stimuli were. As a result, we
would not expect the O stimuli to have distinct and clearly
acquired stimulus functions. Consequently, any generalized
transfer from the A to the O stimuli, and from one O stimulus
to the other, would be difficult to predict. Controlling such an
outcome was not an expressed purpose of this study, although
it is now interesting to note that when they were probed for,
the outcome stimuli did not appear to acquire the same func-
tions as the discriminated conditioned stimuli using the pres-
ent preparation. Third, it is not necessarily a valid assumption
that the outcome stimuli should acquire the same functions as
the A and B cues, since O1 and O2 always followed presen-
tations of the A and B cues, rather than predicting them. It
would be unreasonable to expect in practice for the outcomes
to acquire the same stimulus properties as the A and B stimuli
via backward-conditioning effects (see Hall, 1996). For these
reasons, the purpose of checking for emergent outcome stim-
ulus functions was largely inductive.
Taking all of these arguments together, it may have been
the case that, having no expectation either way about the
functions of O1 and O2, that participants erred on the side of
caution with regard to O1 and O2, in reducing response rates
in the presence of both. Although this explanation is certainly
plausible, it raises yet another query: If nothing was learned
about O1 and O2, and participants merely erred on the side of
caution, then given that similar levels of suppression were
exhibited for B1 as for O1 and O2, can we be confident that
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participants learned that A1 and B1 were equivalent via
common-outcome training, or were they simply erring on
the side of caution with regard to B1 also? We would suggest
that because we found significant suppression to B1 but not
B2, and because the differences between these cues were
significant for all measures, we can be satisfied that acquired
equivalence was demonstrated. Meanwhile, with regard to the
outcomes, we can tentatively conclude that a degree of learning
took place, but that this was impaired by the different modal-
ities of the stimuli, perhaps by their poor discriminability, and
by the fact that they were outcomes rather than cues. If nothing
else, even if we were to assume that any novel stimulus might
have shown the same suppressive effects as B1, O1, and O2,
we can conclude that participants learned that the A2 stimulus
was “safe” and that this knowledge successfully transferred to
B2, which likewise did not show significant suppression.
A potential limitation of the present findings concerns the
fact that participants’ US expectancy ratings were obtained
after a period of extinction. Although the expectancy ratings
data were generally consistent with the observed behavioral
effects, it would be useful to conduct a further study in which
concurrent ratings were obtained within the conditioning task.
This would allow for the simultaneous tracking of expectan-
cies and behavior across the phases of the task.
The conceptual paradigm within which this work was
conducted may offer a further possible explanatory mecha-
nism for the effects observed. More specifically, the present
research was conducted within a behavior-analytic paradigm
in which explanations for the types of experimental effects
reported here might be proffered in terms of stimulus control
alone (Dougher & Markham, 1996; Saunders & Williams,
1998). That is, from our functional perspective, our experi-
mental preparations alone constitute a form of explanation for
the present effects, insofar as they allowed for both prediction
of and influence over the experimental outcomes (Chiesa,
1994; Hayes & Brownstein, 1986; Skinner, 1953). Thus,
whereas attentional and associative-mediation accounts of
the observed effects may serve as useful explanatory heuris-
tics, they may also burden the behavioral researcher with an
obligation to devote undue research attention to the effort to
ratify one or the other account, rather than focus resources on
increasing the predictive and controlling features of the rele-
vant experimental preparations. Adopting a functional ap-
proach to the analysis of behavior may ultimately provide
the more complete and coherent account of any laboratory-
created effects. Indeed, the functional, pragmatic, and parsi-
monious approach is increasingly viewed as one deserving of
consideration by cognitive researchers (De Houwer, 2011; De
Houwer, Barnes-Holmes & Moors, 2013). In conclusion, we
believe that the present findings extend our understanding of
acquired equivalence and offer an innovativemethodology for
studying both such effects and conditioned suppression, re-
gardless of a researcher’s theoretical perspective.
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